MULTILATERAL FUNDING POLICIES AND PRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION: A STUDY OF THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE FUND IN NIGERIA

BY

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CERTIFICATION

This is to certify that the thesis titled “Multilateral Funding Policies and Private Sector Participation: A Study of the African Union Peace Fund in Nigeria” submitted to the School of Postgraduate Studies, African University of Science and Technology (AUST), Abuja, Nigeria, for the award of the Master's Degree is a record of original research carried out by

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Abstract

This study examined the African Union (AU) Peace Fund in Nigeria, exploring its alignment with Multilateral Funding Policies and the role of Private Sector Participation. It assessed multilateral peace funds, reviewed the activities of the 2016 AU Peace Fund, and investigated reasons for the apparent lack of engagement from Nigeria's Organized Private Sector in supporting the AU Peace Fund. Multilateral organizations aim to foster societal peace, yet the AU Peace Fund, a critical element of the African Peace and Security Architecture, has struggled to fulfill this objective. Efforts to revitalize the Fund led to the 2016 Silencing the Guns policy, which recommended private sector involvement. However, the Fragile States Index (FSI) continues to show African countries as highly fragile. The study adopted a mixed-method approach, incorporating both quantitative and qualitative analyses. Data collection involved literature reviews, structured online questionnaires, and Key Informant Interviews (KIIs), guided by the Policy Design Process Theoretical Framework. Findings revealed minimal engagement and low awareness of the AU Peace Fund among Nigeria's Organized Private Sector, with 97% of respondents and their organizations unaware of the Fund and not consulted in the policy design process related to Silencing the Guns. Based on these findings, the study recommends an overhaul of the AU's policy development process to better incorporate the private sector, thereby enhancing the effectiveness of its peace and security initiatives. A comprehensive policy review, with active involvement from the Organized Private Sector in Nigeria, is also advised to align with international best practices and foster a more inclusive and sustainable approach to regional peacebuilding.

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This thesis is dedicated to everyone who has contributed to this journey. Thank you for being part of this significant chapter in my life.

DEDICATION

To Rita, Karis and Sophia

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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

Multilateral organisations, over time, were created to entrench societal peace (Rohwerder, 2014). Peace is one of the fundamental reasons for human existence. The United Nations was created in 1945 after the Second World War (WWII), with the primary policy objective of preventing another world war (UN, n.d). The European Union was also established the same year to avoid European conflicts, which were at the core of both world wars (EU, n.d). The primary policy objectives of these two leading multilateral organisations are peace and security building for development. Both organisations have peace funding agencies: the UN Peacebuilding Fund has three levers, while the European Union has the European Peace Facility (Altamimi, 2022). Notably, the EU has the highest level of multilateral development globally with clearly defined strategic priorities on peace and security, human rights and the rule of law, and sustainable development, which requires collaboration with other countries to tackle (EC, 2021). Meanwhile, the United Nations Sustainable Development Agenda Goal (UN SDG) 16 calls for inclusive and peaceful societies and drastically lower rates of violence (UNGA, 2015).

Peace and Development

Peace, security, and development are crucial for sustainable growth and stability. Global policy frameworks emphasise development efforts' liability to failure without peace and security (AU, 2022). The UN also underscores the centrality of conflict prevention and peacebuilding to achieving Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs),

especially SDG 16, which focuses on promoting peaceful and inclusive societies. Notably, inequality, poverty, and lack of good governance are frequent conflict triggers, disrupting educational systems and healthcare services and leading to long-term setbacks in human capital development (SIPRI, 2015). Focused development and cessation of conflicts have seen substantial improvements in social indicators in Rwanda (UN, 2020). In addition, humanitarian aid integrated with development strategies and peacebuilding efforts creates resilient communities with the capacity to withstand shocks from conflicts (EU, 2020).

African Union Peace Fund

In Africa, the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) realised the centrality of peace and security in development. It established the Peace Fund in 1993 and was to transform it into the AU Peace Fund, with an AU Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) as a comprehensive policy and with the Fund as one of the financing tools for the AU's operational peace and security activities (AU, n.d). The "Peace Fund" was reviewed on July 9, 2002, according to Article 21 of the founding protocol of the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) (AU, 2018). The Fund is among critical efforts to maintain, prevent, and build peace on the continent. However, it has not been operationalised since 1993. In 2003 and 2015, the policy was reviewed to operationalise it.

Notably, the African Union (AU) reviewed the AU Peace Fund (AUPF) in 2003 as a continental source of funding for peace initiatives in response to persisting struggles against insecurity and instability, which have hampered economic growth and any meaningful progress in the continent. The 2015 exercise resulted in the policy in the 2016 AU Peace Fund: Silencing the Guns. The policy identified the private sector as

a critical partner after realising the need for private sector involvement in promoting peace and security in Africa. The African Union Agenda 2063 Goals 11, 12, 13, and 14, which involve transformative leadership, peace and security, human rights and democracy, and a stable and peaceful continent, are closely related to UN SDG 16. AU-led peace support operations (AUPSO) financing remains crucial in the UN - AU relationship (UN, 2023). Since 2008, the UN Security Council has adopted several resolutions to ensure predictability and sustainability in funding AU peace operations (YIRGA et al., 2023). However, Africa is still entangled in complex and interconnected security challenges, making sustainable peace and security financing an African priority and a global strategic imperative (AUPF, 2016). The Fragile States Index (FSI) puts the stability of countries in proper context.

The Fragile States Index (FSI) and Private Sector Engagement

The Fragile State Index, which measures the fragility of states in terms of peace and security between 2016 and 2023, shows that African countries are still among the most fragile and ranked at the top of the Index.

Developed by the Fund for Peace (FFP), FSI assesses a country's susceptibility to conflict and collapse, adopting a comprehensive methodology that creates qualitative and quantitative data to evaluate states' stability. The Index highlights vulnerabilities contributing to state fragility, serving as a valuable resource for policymakers. The quantitative data comprises statistical information from credible International Organisations such as the UN and World Bank. It applies Boolean search phrases to global media data for the analysis of about 45-50 million articles and reports annually from over 10,000 English sources. The qualitative data emanates from expert reviews

by social science researchers, while the indicators include cohesion and economic, political, and social indicators (Fund for Peace, 2023). Table1, Table 2 and Table 3 show the ranking for 2016, 2023, and 2024.



Fig.1 ***FSI Methodology (Fund for Peace, 2023)***

A preliminary assessment of the AUPF's activities indicates little or no private-sector involvement in Nigeria, Africa's most populous country and largest economy. The private sector's participation in the 2016 policy should be a significant factor in supporting the AUPF and preventing the failure of previous policies. The foregoing presents a research problem as to the role of the private sector stipulated in the policy.

AU acknowledges the role of the private sector in attaining its goals of peace, security, and stability even though AU member states are the Fund's primary financial contributors (AU, 2018; AUPF, 2016).

Notably, there are examples of successful private sector involvement in advancing peace and security in some parts of the world, especially in the subnational context (Seyle et al. (2019). These successes should serve as a source of optimism for the potential of private sector involvement in Africa. The private sector is the primary driver of growth and development and a key beneficiary of peace and security.

Given the lack of changes in states' fragility context for African countries and some seeming lack of understanding and visibility regarding the role of the private sector in the AU Peace Fund, this becomes a problem that requires more investigation, resulting in the objectives of the study, namely to assess and discuss multilateral peacebuilding facilities across the world; analyse the AU Peace Fund; determine level of participation of Nigeria’s private sector in the AU Peace Fund; and propose policy approaches to support the operationalisation of the private sector component of the AU Peace Fund.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Despite the revitalisation of the AU Peace Fund under the AU’s Silencing Guns Policy (2016) for enhanced peace and security on the continent (AU, 2016), the Fragile State Index (FSI) of 2024, 2023, and 2016 indicates no change in the fragility framework for African countries (FSI, 2016; FSI, 2023). The Fragile State Index measures the fragility of states in terms of peace and security, showing that African countries are still among the most fragile. In addition, the number of conflicts and

battle-related deaths in Africa between 1989 and 2021 in Figure 1 graphically represents the scope of the issue (Palik et al., 2022). The AU proposed a private-sector partnership to pool resources and address changing threats (AUPF, 2016).

Sort by Indicator: *Hover your mouse at the top of the column you wish to sort and click the sort button:* 2016

Country	Rank	Total											
Somalia	1st	114.0	9.7	10.0	9.4	9.0	9.3	9.5	9.5	9.0	9.7	9.7	9.5
South Sudan	2nd	113.8	10.0	9.7	9.9	9.3	9.0	6.6	9.7	10.0	9.7	9.9	10.0	10.0
Central African Republic	3rd	112.1	9.2	10.0	9.3	8.6	9.9	7.2	9.8	10.0	9.9	8.7	10.0	9.5
Sudan	4th	111.5	9.2	10.0	9.8	8.7	7.6	9.1	9.8	9.1	9.3	9.0	10.0	9.9
Yemen	4th	111.5	10.0	9.5	9.5	9.4	8.4	7.5	9.4	9.3	9.4	9.5	9.6	10.0
Syria	6th	110.8	10.0	9.9	10.0	7.8	7.4	8.6	10.0	8.9	9.8	8.4	10.0	10.0
Chad	7th	110.1	9.1	9.8	8.5	8.0	9.3	8.9	9.2	9.8	9.3	9.9	9.8	8.5
Congo Democratic Republic	8th	110.0	9.2	9.8	9.7	8.1	8.9	6.8	9.3	9.7	10.0	9.1	9.7	9.7
Afghanistan	9th	107.9	10.0	8.6	8.6	8.5	7.5	8.4	9.1	9.6	8.7	9.5	9.5	9.9
Haiti	10th	105.1	7.9	9.6	6.7	8.9	9.5	9.0	9.4	9.4	7.7	9.2	7.9	9.9
Iraq	11th	104.7	10.0	9.6	9.8	6.8	7.5	7.9	9.2	7.8	8.9	8.1	9.4	9.7
Guinea	12th	103.8	9.0	9.9	8.8	9.4	7.4	7.5	9.8	9.2	7.9	8.9	8.4	7.6
Nigeria	13th	103.5	9.7	9.9	9.4	7.7	8.8	7.4	8.8	9.4	9.1	9.1	7.7	6.5
Pakistan	14th	101.7	9.3	8.9	9.7	7.4	7.0	7.3	8.3	8.2	8.2	8.9	8.9	9.6
Burundi	15th	100.7	9.0	8.5	8.1	8.2	7.4	6.5	9.0	8.2	8.5	9.5	9.1	8.7
Zimbabwe	16th	100.5	7.8	9.8	7.5	8.3	8.2	8.1	8.9	8.5	8.4	8.6	8.7	7.7
Guinea Bissau	17th	99.8	9.1	9.6	5.4	8.5	8.7	8.3	8.9	9.5	7.5	8.3	7.5	8.5
Eritrea	18th	98.6	7.4	8.1	6.6	8.3	7.5	8.0	9.5	8.6	9.1	9.1	8.5	7.9
Niger	19th	98.4	8.9	8.9	7.7	8.0	8.2	7.2	7.8	9.2	6.7	9.5	8.0	8.3
Kenya	20th	98.3	8.5	8.9	9.1	7.4	8.0	7.8	7.8	8.2	7.2	9.1	8.0	8.3
Côte d'Ivoire	21st	97.9	7.7	9.4	8.3	6.8	8.2	7.0	8.1	8.7	8.1	8.2	8.0	9.4
Cameroon	22nd	97.8	8.1	9.4	8.5	6.3	8.1	7.8	8.7	8.9	7.7	8.3	8.0	8.0
Uganda	23rd	97.7	7.3	8.9	9.0	6.7	7.6	7.6	8.3	8.5	8.0	8.7	9.1	8.0

Table 1: Fragile State Index (2016) at policy adoption

Sort by Indicator: *Hover your mouse at the top of the column you wish to sort and click the sort button:* 2023

Country	Rank	Total											
Somalia	1st	111.9	9.5	10.0	8.7	9.5	9.1	8.6	9.6	9.8	9.0	10.0	9.0	9.1
Yemen	2nd	108.9	8.6	9.9	8.8	9.9	7.9	6.4	9.8	9.6	9.6	9.6	9.6	9.2
South Sudan	3rd	108.5	9.9	9.2	8.6	8.6	8.6	6.5	9.8	9.7	8.7	9.7	10.0	9.2
Congo Democratic Republic	4th	107.2	8.8	9.6	9.4	8.1	8.4	6.4	9.3	9.3	9.3	9.7	9.8	9.1
Syria	5th	107.1	9.4	9.9	9.1	9.6	6.5	8.0	10.0	9.0	9.1	7.4	9.1	10.0
Afghanistan	6th	106.6	9.7	8.7	8.3	9.6	8.2	8.5	9.4	10.0	8.7	9.2	8.6	7.7
Sudan	7th	106.2	8.3	9.6	9.3	9.3	8.5	7.5	9.4	8.6	9.2	8.8	9.6	8.1
Central African Republic	8th	105.7	8.0	9.4	8.1	8.2	9.6	6.2	8.9	10.0	9.1	9.3	9.5	9.4
Chad	9th	104.6	8.7	9.5	8.1	8.4	8.7	7.7	9.1	9.6	8.4	9.5	9.0	7.9
Haiti	10th	102.9	6.8	9.7	5.5	8.9	9.2	8.3	9.9	9.8	8.7	8.8	7.7	9.6
Ethiopia	11th	100.4	8.6	9.3	8.9	6.8	7.5	6.2	8.2	8.7	8.8	9.8	9.5	8.1
Myanmar	12th	100.2	9.1	9.0	9.7	7.6	7.3	6.3	9.3	9.1	9.3	7.0	9.2	7.3
Mali	13th	99.5	9.6	7.2	8.5	7.5	7.2	7.7	8.6	8.9	7.5	8.8	8.5	9.5
Guinea	14th	98.5	8.7	10.0	9.4	8.0	7.5	6.3	9.7	9.4	7.3	8.8	6.2	7.2
Nigeria	15th	98.0	9.0	9.6	8.6	8.8	8.1	6.7	8.2	8.8	8.6	9.6	6.4	5.6
Zimbabwe	16th	96.9	8.4	10.0	5.9	9.2	7.8	7.1	8.9	8.8	7.8	8.7	7.6	6.7
Libya	17th	96.1	9.5	9.3	7.3	8.9	6.4	5.0	9.6	8.0	9.3	6.0	7.5	9.3
Ukraine	18th	95.9	10.0	8.0	6.8	8.5	4.9	8.9	6.4	7.3	7.8	7.3	10.0	10.0
Eritrea	19th	94.5	6.0	8.4	8.7	7.1	7.9	8.6	9.7	8.1	9.1	7.7	6.6	6.6
Burundi	20th	94.2	7.8	8.5	6.7	8.8	7.2	5.2	9.1	8.0	8.6	8.7	8.0	7.6
Burkina Faso	21st	94.0	9.3	8.2	5.8	7.2	8.3	7.0	7.4	8.6	7.0	8.3	8.2	8.7
Cameroon	21st	94.0	8.1	9.3	8.1	6.0	7.4	6.9	8.8	8.3	7.3	9.0	8.4	6.4
Mozambique	21st	94.0	7.0	6.3	7.4	7.7	9.2	7.1	7.1	9.7	7.2	9.6	7.9	7.8

Table 2: Fragile State Index (2023)

Fragile States Index 2024

Select Year: 2024

Sort by Indicator: *Hover your mouse at the top of the column you wish to sort and click the sort button:*

Country	Rank	Total												
Somalia	1st	111.3	9.7	10.0	9.0	9.2	9.0	8.5	9.7	9.5	8.7	10.0	9.0	9.0
Sudan	2nd	109.3	9.3	9.6	9.6	9.4	8.8	8.0	9.5	9.0	9.3	8.9	9.7	8.2
South Sudan	3rd	109.0	10.0	9.2	8.7	8.6	8.6	6.4	9.9	9.8	8.8	9.7	10.0	9.3
Syria	4th	108.1	9.7	9.9	8.8	9.9	6.6	7.7	10.0	9.1	8.8	8.4	9.2	10.0
Congo Democratic Republic	5th	106.7	8.3	9.9	9.4	8.2	8.5	6.3	9.4	9.2	9.0	9.8	9.9	8.8
Yemen	6th	106.6	8.1	9.9	8.8	9.6	7.6	6.2	9.8	9.7	9.3	9.3	9.3	9.0
Afghanistan	7th	103.9	9.2	8.7	8.0	9.6	8.3	7.0	9.6	9.7	8.8	8.9	8.1	8.0
Central African Republic	7th	103.9	7.5	9.9	7.8	7.7	9.3	6.0	9.4	10.0	8.7	8.9	9.6	9.1
Haiti	9th	103.5	7.0	9.7	5.8	8.6	8.9	8.0	10.0	9.9	9.2	8.9	7.8	9.7
Chad	10th	102.7	8.4	9.5	8.4	8.1	8.4	7.4	8.7	9.6	8.1	9.0	9.5	7.6
Myanmar	11th	100.0	9.3	9.0	9.4	7.8	7.2	6.0	9.5	9.2	9.6	7.1	8.9	7.0
Ethiopia	12th	98.1	7.9	9.3	8.6	6.5	7.8	5.9	8.0	8.9	8.5	9.9	9.0	7.8
Palestine	13th	97.8	8.0	8.3	6.2	7.0	7.0	9.4	8.8	8.0	8.1	9.0	8.0	10.0
Mali	14th	97.3	9.7	7.6	8.2	7.0	6.9	7.4	8.7	8.9	7.6	9.1	8.2	8.0
Nigeria	15th	96.6	8.7	9.6	8.3	8.9	8.0	6.6	8.3	8.9	8.3	9.6	6.1	5.3
Libya	16th	96.5	9.2	9.0	7.0	8.4	6.9	4.9	9.3	7.7	9.4	7.0	8.4	9.3
Guinea	17th	96.4	8.7	10.0	9.2	7.5	7.2	6.0	9.4	9.2	7.3	9.1	5.9	6.9
Zimbabwe	18th	95.7	8.1	10.0	5.6	9.3	8.0	7.0	9.1	8.5	7.9	8.5	7.3	6.4
Niger	19th	95.2	9.0	9.9	7.4	7.0	7.7	6.3	6.7	9.6	6.8	8.8	8.0	8.0
Cameroon	20th	94.3	7.8	9.6	7.8	6.5	7.3	6.6	9.2	8.4	7.4	9.3	8.1	6.3
Burkina Faso	21st	94.2	9.5	8.2	5.9	7.1	8.4	6.9	7.1	8.7	7.1	8.6	8.3	8.4

Table 3: Fragile State Index (2024)

Table 1 shows the peace and security situation in 2016 when the AU Silencing the Guns Policy was adopted, while Tables 2 and 3 show that of 2023 and 2024 within the context of the Fragile States Index (FSI)



Number of conflicts and battle -related deaths in relation to conflicts and wars in Africa 1989–2021 **(Palik et al., 2022)**

Fig. 2: Number of Battle-Related Deaths in Relation To Conflicts and Wars in Africa (1989-2021)

1.3 Objectives of Study

The Objectives of the study are as follows:

i. To assess and discuss multilateral peacebuilding facilities across the world.

ii. To evaluate the AU Peace Fund activities of the AU Peace Fund of 2016.

iii. To identify/determine factors responsible for the seeming non-participation of Nigeria's Organised Private Sector in the AU Peace Fund.

iv. To propose policy measures to support the operationalisation of the private sector component of the AU Peace Fund in Nigeria.

1.4 Research Questions

Having established the objectives of the study, the research addressed the following key questions:

i. What are the features and characteristics of multilateral peacebuilding facilities across the world?

ii. What is the operational and efficiency status of the AU Peace Fund in Nigeria?

iii. What factors are responsible for the seeming non-participation of the Nigeria's organised private sector in the AU Peace Fund?

iv. What are the feasible policy approaches that could support the operationalisation of the private sector component of the AU Peace Fund in Nigeria?

1.5 Study Assumption

Following a literature review, the study assumes that the Private Sector's non-involvement in the AU peace fund policy formulation is responsible for its lack of engagement with African peace efforts. Consequently, the independent variable is the level of Organized Private Sector participation in policy design. In contrast, the dependent variable is the Level of engagement.

1.6 Significance of Study

The research will enhance understanding of multilateral funding strategies and private sector involvement in peacebuilding initiatives. The study is expected to provide insight into how well-informed the Organized Private Sector is on the AU Peace Fund's role in promoting peace, as well as the role of the private sector in the peace effort. Policymakers, donors, and private sector organisations will benefit from the result of the study, providing insights into a better understanding of the AU Peace Fund, using private sector resources and expertise to advance peace and stability, and involve the private sector in peacebuilding initiatives.

1.7 Definition of Key Terms

Multilateral Funding Policy

Multilateral Funding Policies are strategic techniques and guidelines designed by governments, intergovernmental bodies, international organisations, and donors to provide financial support for realising the mandates of the affected bodies.

Peace Fund

Peace Funds are financial instruments established by governments and international organisations to support peace and security efforts in line with their mandate. The

primary features of peacebuilding funds are their Purpose and objectives, Legal Basis and Structure, Funding and Contributions, Governance, and Management.

Private Sector

The private sector is the segment of the economy that is not controlled by the state. It comprises businesses and organisations owned and run by private people or groups rather than the government.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Literature Review

A concise timeline of the AU Peace Fund reflects initial challenges, reform efforts, and sustained appraisals to improve its effectiveness. Significant efforts have been made since the Fund's establishment; however, sustainability and local engagement remain imperatives.

The AU Peace Fund (2013) was officially launched in 2013 as part of the AU's Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) to finance peace support operations and conflict prevention initiatives on the continent (AU, 2018). This trailed the establishment in July 2001 of the African Union to succeed the Organization of African Unity (OAU) towards a fresh commitment to addressing peace and security across the African continent. The 2014-2016 Peace Fund operationalisation faced challenges (AU, 2018), including insufficient funding and reliance on external donors, underscoring the pertinence of sustainable funding mechanisms.

Furthermore, the AU's Agenda 2063 underscores self-reliance in peace and security financing initiatives. Promoting African stability and development is contingent on the AU Peace Fund. The AU 2017 initiative to enhance the effectiveness of its peace and security operations included increased contributions from member states to the Peace Fund for enhanced financial autonomy.

A recent appraisal of the Peace Fund from 2020 focused on assessing its effectiveness in supporting missions like UNAMID in Darfur and AMISOM in Somalia

(Elamin, 2024). Some studies highlight achievements and emphasise inadequate funding and logistical challenges.

2.2 Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework of the study is the Policy Design Process. Policy design is a deliberate process of defining policy objectives and connecting them to instruments or tools expected to achieve them (Howlett et al., 2015). The framework of choice aims to determine if policy design and implementation flaws may have caused the AU Peace Fund's inability to achieve its objectives after several attempts at operationalising the Peace Fund. Bielak (n.d) identifies five concise policy-making stages: Agenda setting, Policy formulation, Decision-Making, Policy Implementation, and Policy evaluation.



Fig.3: Bielak, (n.d)



Fig. 4: Expanded Policy Design Process (Mahroum et al., 2016)

Mahroum et al. (2016) present a more elaborate policy design schematic comprising problem definition, consultation, formulation and evaluation of alternatives, public hearings, stakeholder involvement, decision-making, implementation, monitoring and adjustments, and policy redesign, and back to problem definition. (Hicklin et al., 2009) underscore the role of managerial quality and networking in policy processes and performance evaluation. (Bressers & O'Toole, 2024) argue that policy experts should consider the first goal of policy design as realising expected responses from organisations involved.

Brenton et al., (2022) examined common policy concepts, such as policy success and failure, to determine if the policy capacity of the state has recently diminished. The study argued for more consideration of societal demands on governments. It used the battery analogy to propose three interconnected policy capacity dimensions, including administrative capital, contingent political management, and expectations satisfaction, that better capture supply and demand's qualities and relationality. (Mahroum et al., 2016) advocate further research in designing effective participatory policy consultation processes. Current literature lacks a systematic analysis despite the importance of policy design (Barbosa de Aguiar et al., 2023). The literature review was carried out against the framework of policy design process.

2.2 European Union Common Security and Defence Policy/ European Peace Facility

European Union's **Common Security and Defence Policy** (CSDP) enables the Union to lead peacekeeping operations, avert conflict, and enhance international security. It is a fundamental element of the European Union's overarching strategy for crisis management, employing both civilian and military assets. European Union have

initiatives for enhancing both public and private investment in global infrastructure and connectivity, aiming for a holistic strategy for security and defence. This falls within the scope of the EU's Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy (European Union, 2021; EUROPA, 2021). Moreover, (EU, 2021) argues that private sector collaboration is an essential element of the EU's holistic strategy for crisis management, employing both civilian and military resources The EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework (CDPF) seeks to strengthen the cyber defence capabilities of EU member states and encourage private sector involvement in this domain (EU, 2014). The European Union stipulated measures to enhance public and private investment in global infrastructure and connectivity, reflecting a thorough strategy for security and defence (EU, 2021). The efficacy of the CSDP-private sector collaboration is illustrated in the European Union's initiatives to address diverse security challenges by utilising public and private resources.

EULEX Kosovo (EULEX, 2021), EUBAM Moldova-Ukraine, and the European Peace Facility exemplify EU cooperation with the private sector. The EU's emphasis on civilian-military cooperation and the promotion of private investment in global infrastructure underscores a holistic approach to security and defence. The EU Conflict Early Warning System (EWS) assesses the vulnerability of non-EU nations to violent conflict (EULEX, 2022). Since 2012, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) has invested €601 million in Kosovo, focusing on promoting a green economy, competitive private sector development, and regional integration (EBRD, 2023). Public-private partnerships (PPPs) in Europe may exemplify a collaborative framework for the private sector's engagement with the African Union (AU), emphasising contributions to peace driven by non-political

motivations such as pragmatism, profit, networking, and leadership. The Cross-Border Business Cooperation in the Irish Border Region exemplifies effective private-sector collaboration in peace initiatives. Literature underscores the capacity of the private sector to aid peacebuilding initiatives through non-political incentives, including pragmatism and profit, alongside networking and leadership.

The European Union created the European Peace Facility (EPF) in 2021 to strengthen its conflict prevention capacity, peacebuilding, and international security. EPA's key features include an off-budget of over €17 billion for 2021-2071, a two-pillar structure: operations and assistance measures, global reach, Flexibility for rapid response and risk-tolerant financing for peacebuilding initiatives, and the ability to provide military equipment and support to partners (Deneckere, 2019; EC, n.d)

The literature acknowledges the significant potential of private sector involvement in peacebuilding initiatives. The African Union (AU) recognises that the private sector can bring about economic and social change in Africa, paving the way for peace-building efforts on the continent (AU, 2021). However, the literature does not fully explore the potential of the sector's involvement in the 'Silencing the Guns' policy design process. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2018) holds that private investment could strengthen peacebuilding and funding initiatives by filling budget gaps in the public sector, emphasising the urgent need for the sector's participation in the policy process. With its resources, neutrality, and ability to develop the economy, the private sector could significantly support efforts to promote peace (Jyoti et al., 2006). Given the private sector's critical role in investment, production, and trade across Africa, the success of the African

Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) depends on its active participation (EU, 2023). Amani Africa's (2020) brief on the policy highlights some seeming achievements in conflict areas of Africa, Sudan and Central Africa Republic (CAR) but does not discuss private sector contributions to policy design.

Private Sector involvement in the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) in Africa is typical of private sector participation in the peace process to prevent the trade of "conflict diamonds" that fuel armed conflicts. (SARR, 2014) argues that private sector participation in peacemaking in African mineral-rich conflict-torn zones emanates from international pressure, not genuine conflict resolution and development efforts. This may have informed the inability of the AU Peace Fund to truly eradicate conflicts in Africa thirty-one years after its creation in 1993.

The African Union Master Roadmap of Practical Steps to Silence the Guns, Lusaka roadmap, did not mention the private sector's involvement in the policy design (AU, 2016). Howlett (2009) argues that evidence-based policy-making must restructure policy processes to avoid or minimise policy failures from a mismatch between government expectations and actual conditions on the ground, providing more significant policy-relevant information. This is essential given the lack of mention of the private sector in the policy design process of silencing guns.

Angel (2015) holds that a systemic-level analysis supports the need for avenues for private sector organisations and third-party companies to enhance governments' policy analytical capacity. This improves policy success and minimises the tendency to fail. Effective policy formulation environments or spaces (Mukherjee, 2021),

including robust stakeholder engagement, are prerequisites for successful policy design.

(Vhumbun et al., 2023) focuses on monitoring and evaluating the Ten-Year Implementation Plan of Agenda 2063 regarding peace and security rather than on the possible impact of effectively crafted policy. The Silencing the Guns initiative is primarily driven and designed by African Governments and the African Union from the top, as it is characteristic of most policy designs on the continent. The private sector is recognised as an essential implementation partner rather than a critical co-architect of the policy. (UNDP, 2022) "recommitted its partnerships, programs and opportunities to furthering the Silencing the Guns agenda", suggesting some level of non-governmental participation, but does not mention private sector roles in the policy process. (AU, n.d.) documented the history and functions of the Peace Fund, including potential private sector fund contributions, but the literature does not indicate their involvement in shaping the Fund's policies.

Poverty, economic hardships, constitution manipulation, human rights violations, exclusion, and inequalities drive the majority of crises and violent conflicts in Africa (Achinko, 2021). (Check et al., 2021) articulated various security challenges confronting Africa, ranging from Boko Haram and Al Shabab to election-related violence, and assessed the work of the Africa Peace and Security Architecture. (Velthuizen, A., 2020) delves into how China can contribute to revitalising the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) but concludes that China’s military intervention capacity in Africa aims to protect its interests. There is a significant reduction in the spread of violent conflicts in Africa. However, the menace remains in

some African countries with its consequence of transnational crime, terrorism, and the proliferation of small arms and lights weapons (SALW) (Lamara, 2019).

The inability to meet the 'Silence the Guns by 2020' program and its deferral until 2030 owes to the non-realisation of the mechanisms outlined in aspiration 4(32) of the AU 2063 Agenda (Loic, 2024), concluding that a high risk that the second deadline will also not be met if the mechanisms are not met. (Bokeriya et al., 2023) underscore a direct connection between the security situation in Africa, the effective implementation of the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda, and the UN-AU strategic partnership.

Literature examines the effectiveness of peace funds using eclectic criteria, including their impact on conflict resolution, community engagement, and long-term sustainability. It considers the effectiveness of Peace Fund Challenges and Case Studies.

Tadesse (2023) appraised the sustainability and effectiveness of African-led counterterrorism Peace Support Operations (PSO) and illustrated the limitations of a military-heavy response.

2.3 ECOWAS Peace Fund (EPF)

Established under Article 36 of the 1999 ECOWAS Protocol involving the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, the ECOWAS Peace Fund (EPF) became fully operational in May 2006, constituting one of the six (6) pillars of the ECOWAS Peace and Security Architecture (ECOWAS, 2018). EPF has been instrumental in financing peacekeeping missions and conflict resolution efforts in countries such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau

(Punch Newspapers, 2024). However, Funding, poor coordination, conflict of interests, lack of agreement, inadequate human and logistics capacity constrain African countries' ability to achieve peace and security agenda (Arthur, 2017).

ECOWAS Peace Fund is not spared of this challenge, such that in August 2024, The Economic Community of West African States unveiled a five-year strategic plan to rejuvenate the ECOWAS Peace Fund, targeting resource mobilisation and regional capacity development (Punch Newspapers, 2024; ECOWAS DPCC, 2024). The strategy aims at fully operationalising and institutionalising the EPF within the ECOWAS Commission. (ECOWAS, 2024). The Peace Fund strategic plan, which targets US$300 million in five (5) years, also plans to engage private sector support (CNBC, 2024). In addition, the ECOWAS Fund has succeeded in engaging the African Development Bank (AfDB), the European Union (EU), and various donor countries like Canada and Japan, facilitating financial contributions that enhance its response capability (Baobab Africa, 2024). Though jointly managed peace operations are relevant, research on their effectiveness still needs to be conducted (Plank, 2022).

While there is growing interest in private sector engagement with the AU Peace Fund, extensive searches in major databases such as Scopus and Google Scholar indicated a dearth of scholarly literature on private sector involvement in the AU Peace Fund. This dearth of literature on the absence/failure of private sector components constitutes the gap the study intends to fill. This may have contributed to the passive nature of the private sector component of the AU peace fund.

2.4 Review of Previous Studies

Multilateral organisations such as the African Union aim to entrench peace (Rohwerder, 2014) as the fundamental reason for human existence. The United Nations was created with the primary policy objective of preventing another world war (UN, n.d). At the same time, the European Union was established to avoid conflicts in Europe, which were at the core of the First and Second World Wars (EU, n.d). The primary policy objectives of the UN and The EU are peace and security building for development, with both organisations having peace funding agencies: the UN Peacebuilding Fund with three levers and the European Peace Facility (Altamimi, 2022). Notably, the EU has clearly defined strategic priorities on peace and security, human rights and the rule of law, and sustainable development, which requires collaboration with other countries to tackle (EC, 2021). Meanwhile, the United Nations Sustainable Development Agenda Goal (UN SDG) 16 calls for inclusive and peaceful societies and drastically lower rates of violence (UNGA, 2015).

The AU Peace Fund (2013) was officially launched in 2013 as part of the AU's Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) to finance peace support operations and conflict prevention initiatives on the continent (AU, 2018). The 2014-2016 Peace Fund operationalisation faced challenges (AU, 2018), including insufficient funding and reliance on external donors, underscoring the pertinence of sustainable funding mechanisms.

The literature acknowledges the significance of private sector involvement in peacebuilding initiatives (Hicklin et al., 2009; Howlett, 2009; Angel, 2015; Mukherjee, 2021). It underscores the significance of networking in policy processes and

performance evaluation. AU (2021) recognises the private sector's role in economic and social change and peace-building on the continent. The OECD (2018) underscores that private investment could strengthen peacebuilding initiatives by filling budget gaps. African Union Master Roadmap of Practical Steps to Silence the Guns, Lusaka roadmap (AU, 2016) explores mechanisms towards peace efforts on the continent. UN Peace Fund supports peace initiatives, delivers fast, flexible, relevant peacebuilding funding, and Effective fund management (UN, n.d). A recent appraisal of the Peace Fund from 2020 focused on assessing its effectiveness in supporting missions like UNAMID in Darfur and AMISOM in Somalia (Elamin, 2024). Though studies highlight achievements, inadequate funding and logistical challenges remain.

The Fragile State Index measures the fragility of states in terms of peace and security between 2016 and 2023. The index shows that African countries are still among the most fragile and ranked at the top of the Index. Though jointly managed peace operations are relevant, research on their effectiveness still needs to be significantly explored (Plank, 2022).

2.5 Summary of Literature Reviewed

The literature review exposed the dearth of literature on private sector involvement in multilateral peace funding, notably on the poor involvement of Africa's private sector in the AU Peace Fund activities. It further highlighted the private sector's lack of participation in implementing peace efforts. The literature review indicates a purely intergovernmental character of the AU Peace Fund policy of Silencing the Guns by 2020, without private sector involvement in policy formulation. It shows a top-down

policy approach, a significant challenge in Nigeria and African policy formulation strategies. Literature on the AU Peace Fund and Silencing the Guns focused on the role of the private sector as an implementation partner; however, it does not indicate the sector's involvement during the policy formulation stage, indicating a lack of literature on the poor involvement of Nigeria's private sector. The inability to meet the 'Silence the Guns by 2020' program and its deferral until 2030 owes to the non-realisation of the mechanisms outlined in aspiration 4(32) of the AU 2063 Agenda (Loic, 2024), concluding that a high risk that the second deadline will also not be met if the mechanisms are not met. The dearth of literature on the poor involvement of the private sector in multilateral peace funding within the continent constitutes the gap the study intends to fill.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Research Design and Approach

The study adopts a mixed method (Havard, n.d) involving qualitative and quantitative data. (Wasti (2022) examines the growing importance of mixed research and its strengths and weaknesses. Johnson et al. (2007) discuss the concept of mixed research methods.



Fig. 5: Basic Mixed Methods Research Designs (Havard n.d)

First, an extensive literature search on major databases, including Scopus and Google Scholar, was conducted to identify relevant sources for the study using the search criteria: “AU Peace Fund + Private Sector”, “NACCIMA + AU Peace Fund,”

AU + NESG) and related keywords. The methodology involved using exact keywords as search criteria on the African Union and related websites to determine any record of partnership between the AU and these Nigeria-based private sector organisations at any time**.** AI tools like Perplexity and Mendeley facilitated the study and citation**.**

Database direct searches on Google Scholar and Scopus and the research rabbit software were also used to identify related literature regarding private sector participation in the AU Silencing the Guns Policy.

3.2 Population of the Study:

The Nigeria Organised Private Sector (OPS). Though Nigeria is one country out of 55 in the AU, Nigeria is Africa's largest economy (about 15% of Africa's 2019 GDP) and the most populous country (about 15% of Africa's population). Therefore, the Nigeria OPS is statistically significant as a study population. Nigeria Organised Private Sector, especially MAN, NECA, NACCIMA, NESG

3.3 Sampling Size and Sampling Technique:

Targeted sampling, especially of Organised Private Sector officials such as NACCIMA, MAN, and NESG, who ideally should be aware and contribute as envisaged in the AU 2016 peace policy. The study deployed an online questionnaire designed with Google Forms, recording fourteen respondents. The sampling size is significant, given that over 92.8% of respondents have five years of service in the private sector or more. In addition, targeted key informant interviews with high-ranking officials were used to validate the questionnaire responses.

The questionnaire had most of its questions structured on a 5-point Likert Scale, with respondents having the options of ‘Strongly Agree’, ‘Agree’, ‘Neutral’, ‘Disagree’ and ‘Strongly Disagree’.

3.4 Instrumentation

A structured questionnaire and a Key Informant Interview (KII) were conducted.

3.5 Data Collection

Interviews and consultations were held with AU Desk staff at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Foreign Affairs staff attached to the African Union to determine the level of involvement of Private sectors in Nigeria with the AU peace process. The study also engaged Nigerian organised private sector members, NACCIMA, MAN, and the NESG**,** to determine their involvement with peace efforts awareness level. The study interviewed the Director (Research & Advocacy) at the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria (MAN) for his insights. This was crucial because the Director has had over 30 years of engagement with the private sector in Nigeria.

Furthermore, an online electronic survey designed with Google Forms was deployed to sectors related to the organised private sector, including financial services, ICT, oil and gas, agri/agro-business, and manufacturing. Respondent data were compared with secondary data from the literature review and interview.

As part of the study, interviews were held with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs AU Desk staff in Abuja and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs staff attached to the African Union in Addis Ababa to determine any prior engagements. Furthermore**,** an email inquiry was made to the Chairman NESG to determine any prior engagements between the two bodies, which returned null collaborations.

Following the literature review, the study proposed six (6) research questions. The study examined progress reports, financial statements of the Peace Fund, and annual reports to determine any contributions from the Nigeria-based organized private sector. The study also used case studies from other regions, such as the European Union Peace Facility, to determine the success rate of private sector involvement in peace efforts. The information obtained was subsequently analysed to determine the level of Nigeria's Organised Private Sector awareness of the Peace Fund.

3.6. Method of Data Analysis

The study adopted qualitative and quantitative data analysis. The qualitative analysis involved data from interviews with high-ranking members of the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria (MAN), Nigeria Economic Summit Group (NESG), the AU Desk at Nigeria's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the AU Peace Fund Secretariat in Adis Ababa. However, the quantitative analysis involved data collected through structured online Google Forms surveys. The study used thematic analysis for the qualitative data and descriptive statistics for the quantitative analysis. In this regard, Google Forms' built-in statistical and data analysis tool was used to generate percentage pie charts to present and analyse quantitative data from respondents. These are presented from Fig 6 to Fig 13. In addition, data from the financial statements of the AU Peace Fund showing revenue sources were also analysed for indications of private sector contributions. This was followed by integrating the qualitative and quantitative data for the triangulation of the study.

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION

4.1 Presentation of Findings

The study deployed an online questionnaire designed with Google Forms, recording fourteen respondents. Given that such a multilateral policy like the AU Peace Fund should involve the Organized Private Sector (OPS), attempts were made to collect data from key stakeholders in the sector, especially from MAN, NACCIMA, NESG, and NECA.

4.2 Data and Statistical Analysis

The findings are presented using the following percentage pie charts, which show respondents by gender, private sector membership, subsector, number of active years in the private sector, awareness of the Fund, involvement in its design, and contribution to the Fund.



Fig. 6: Gender of respondents
The chart above indicates that 71.4% of respondents are males, while 28.6% are females.



Fig. 7: Subsectors of Nigeria's Organised Private Sector

The chart above indicates the subsector representation of respondents, showing manufacturing (9.1%), Government Agency (9.1%), ICT (18.2%), Agriculture/Agribusiness (9.1%) and Financial Services (54.5%).



Fig. 8: Membership of the Nigeria Organised Private Sector

The chart above indicates the Nigeria-organised Private Sector membership of respondents: NESG (28.6%), NACCIMA (14.3%), NASME (14.3%), MAN (28.6%), and NECA (14.3%)



Fig. 9: Number of active years of respondents in the Private Sector

The chart above indicates the number of active years of respondents in the Private Sector: 0-4years (7.1%), 5-9years (21.4%), and 10 years and above (71.4%)



Fig. 10: Statistics of Respondents Aware of the African Union Peace Fund
The figure above shows that 78.5% of respondents are unaware of the African Union Peace Fund. Findings indicate that the remaining 21.4% stumbled on the information and did not base their decision on institutional awareness of their organisation.



Fig. 11: Statistics of Respondents who were either aware, consulted or involved in the design of the AU Silencing the Guns Policy 2016
The figure above indicates that 99.9% of respondents were not consulted, aware or involved in the design of the AU Silencing the Guns Policy 2016.



Fig. 12: Statistics of Respondents whose organisations they work/worked with contributed to the AU Peace Fund.
The figure above indicates that the organisations of over 86% of respondents have not contributed to the AU Peace Fund.



Fig. 13: Statistics of Respondents who were aware of the AU Policy to involve the Private Sector in Peace efforts through the AU Peace Fund

The figure above shows that 85.7 % of respondents are unaware of the AU Policy to involve the Private Sector in Peace efforts through the AU Peace Fund.

REVENUE SOURCE	AMOUNT
Member States Assessed Contributions	$279,069,008.43
Voluntary contribution from President of Senegal	$449,463.45
Interest earned on investment of Peace Fund assets	$16,904,183.52
Legacy Peace Fund transferred to the revitalised Peace Fund	$25,032,053.75
REVITALISED PEACE FUND BALANCE ON 17 AUGUST 2022	**$321,504,709.15[2]**

Table 4: Balance of Revitalized AU Peace Fund on 17 August 2022 (AU, 2022)

The figure above indicates revenue sources for the Peace Fund. There are no indications of private sector contributions to the Peace Fund or from Development Partners.

REVITALISED PEACE FUND BALANCE: 31 AUGUST 2023	
DESCRIPTION	**AMOUNT IN USD**
Assessed MS Contributions to RPF	313,923,922.80
Voluntary contributions (received from Senegal)	499,643.45
Proceeds from Legacy Peace Fund	25,032,053.75
Interest earned on investments on fixed deposit over 3 years	16,899,946.00
Interest earned (net of fees) from investments with fund managers over 1 year	9,462,862.15
Withdrawals (from Crisis Reserve Facility)	(4,000,000.00)
FUND OF THE RPF AS OF 31 AUGUST 2023	**361,782,665.67**
Main Peace Fund portfolio as of 31 August 2023	360,604,245.17
CRF portfolio as of 31 August 2023*	1,178,420.50

Table 5: Balance of Revitalized AU Peace Fund on 31 August 2023 (AU, 2023)

The figure above indicates revenue sources for the Peace Fund. There are no indications of private sector contributions to the Peace Fund or from Development Partners.

4.3 Results of Key Informant Interview

Furthermore, efforts were made to contact 2016 Organised Private Sector officials, though as formal organisations, file copies of interactions with AU, if any, should be readily available to current officials. Following the questionnaire data from respondents, a Key Informant Interview (KII) was conducted with leading members of Nigeria OPS, such as MAN and NESG, focused on the level of awareness of the AU Peace Fund policy on Silencing Guns (2016). Findings, including literature review, did not indicate organised private-sector engagements with the Peace Fund, institutional awareness of the AU Peace Fund, involvement in the design of the 'Silencing the Guns' Policy, or contributions to AU Peace Fund initiatives. These further validate the responses from the questionnaire and literature review. The study found that:

i. There are no Organized Private Sector engagements and awareness with the AU Peace Fund: NESG, MAN, NACCIMA, etc.

ii. 97% of respondents and their organisations were not consulted in the policy design process of the AU Peace Fund on Silencing the Guns.

iii. Interview with two high-ranking officials from the Nigerian Private sector with long years of active service in the private sector indicated neither institutional engagement with the PF nor policy design process;

Iv Consultation with AU Desk Officer Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not provide any indicators of engagement or involvement

iv. Interview with a Desk Officer Peace Fund Secretariat Addis Ababa gave credence to the findings.

In addition, contact with the Nigerian Economic Summit Group (NESG) Chairman indicated no engagements with the AU Peace Fund. A survey response by a respondent affiliated with the organisation also substantiated the response. Also, an interview with a Ministry of Foreign Affairs Staff member attached to the Peace Fund Secretariat in Adis Ababa noted no direct collaboration between Nigeria's Organized Private Sector and AU peace efforts before 2023, except a recent resource mobilisation drive in 2024 by the PF secretariat to engage the organised private sector in contributing to the AU Peace Fund purse.

An interview granted by a Director at the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria (MAN) with over 30 years of engagement in Nigeria's private Sector indicated that he only had personal knowledge of Silencing the Guns about 6 to 7 years ago. However, he had no personal engagement with the AU regarding the policy. Institutionally, the respondent indicated that responsible AU departments have never engaged with either MAN or Nigeria's Organised Private Sector, noting that ECOWAS is also in a similar boat. While citing funding as a potential reason for the lack of engagement with the private sector, the Director recommended how the Private Sector can enhance the operations and objectives of the AU Peace Fund as follows:

i. Organise projects directly with the Private Sector, adopting the coalition approach rather than the individual approach
ii. Capacity building and sensitisation of the Organised Private Sector in Nigeria. In this regard, the AU or other international organisations should sensitise stakeholders in Nigeria about peace initiatives and the policy towards guaranteed peace.

iii. Effective management of the AU Peace Fund

iv. Adopt Project Preparatory Program.

v. Stakeholder engagement and mapping to enlarge the scope to include Civil Society Groups as the Organized Private Sector comprises primarily businesses.

4.4 Answers to Research Questions

This study, “Multilateral Funding Policy and Private Sector Participation: A Study of the African Union Peace Fund in Nigeria”, examined six research questions: what are the features of multilateral peacebuilding facilities across the world? What is the operational and efficiency status of the AU Peace Fund? What factors are responsible for the seeming non-participation of the private sector in the AU Peace Fund? What is the level of awareness of the organised private sector in Nigeria of the AU Peace Fund? What is the level of awareness of Nigeria’s Organised Private-Sector of the 2016 AU Policy on Silencing the Guns (2016)? and Was the Organised Private Sector involved in designing the 2016 AU Peace Fund policy on Silencing the Guns? The research questions are examined below:

Q1: What are the features of multilateral peacebuilding facilities across the world?

In general, the primary features of peacebuilding funds comprise Purpose and objectives, Legal Basis and Structure, Funding and Contributions, Governance and Management. Literature reveals that multilateral peacebuilding facilities support peace and security activities, deliver fast, flexible, relevant, risk-tolerant funding, and effectively manage funds. The United Nations peacebuilding funds provide flexible, catalytic, and timeous financing in responding to peacebuilding efforts. The

study found that multilateral Peace Fund policies recognise the private sector as a critical partner in promoting global peace and security. It also highlights funding and strategic fund management as essential to the effective management of multilateral peace funds across the globe. The study identified that Peace Funds are instrumental in financing peacekeeping missions and conflict resolution efforts, such as the ECOWAS peace Fund in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau (Punch Newspapers, 2024). Funding, poor coordination, conflict of interests, lack of agreement, inadequate human and logistics capacity have prominently featured and constrained Africa's ability to achieve peace and security for development. The European Peace Facility (EPF) is aimed at strengthening conflict prevention capacity, peacebuilding, and international security, featuring an off-budget of over €17 billion, a 2-pillar structure: operations and assistance measures, global reach, flexibility for rapid response as well as risk-tolerant financing for peacebuilding initiatives, and the ability to provide military equipment and support to partners (Deneckere, 2019; EC, n.d). The study identifies nation-states as primary financial contributors to Peace Funds (AU, 2018; AUPF, 2016).

Q2: What is the operational and efficiency status of the AU Peace Fund?

Literature shows that the AU Peace Fund has been operationally inefficient. It has yet to achieve its objectives of entrenching peace for development in Africa and faces critical funding challenges. Promoting African stability and development is contingent on the AU Peace Fund, whose 2017 initiative to revitalise the fund for enhanced peace and security operations comprised contributions from member states to improve the Fund's financial autonomy. The study found AUPF's effectiveness in supporting UNAMID in Darfur and AMISOM in Somalia (Elamin, 2024). Though

studies highlight some achievements, they emphasise inadequate funding and logistical challenges of the Peace Fund. The Policy on Silencing the Guns by 2020 did not achieve its objectives as there are yet myriad conflicts in parts of the continent that have significantly impacted human development. In addition, interviews with Key Informants in the private sector have also cited faulty policies of the AU and ECOWAS as partly responsible for the inefficiency of the Peace Fund of the two multilateral organisations. The 2022 and 2023 financial statements (Table 4 and Table 5) of the Fund showing revenue sources also indicate that contributions were from member states without any contribution from the private sector, with significant implications on activating the private sector component of the Peace Fund activities.

Q3: What factors are responsible for the seeming non-participation of the private sector in the AU Peace Fund?

This study found a lack of institutional awareness of the organised private sector of the AU Peace Fund policy and non-involvement of the Sector in the policy design process. The survey indicates that 97% of respondents and their organisations were not consulted in the policy design process of the AU Peace Fund on Silencing the Guns. This is supported by responses from high-ranking officials from the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria (MAN) and the Nigerian Economic Summit Group (NESG). The long service years of 92% of the respondents also support the findings, agreeing with findings from the literature review of the lack of involvement of the private sector in the activities of the Fund. The 2022 and 2023 financial statements (Table 4 and Table 5) of the Fund showing revenue sources also indicate that contributions were from member states without any contribution from the private sector. The implication is that if the Private sector is not involved in the policy

formulation and design process, there will be a lack of ownership and stake in the implementation process, resulting in a passive private sector component of the policy.

Q4: What is the level of awareness of the Organised private sector in Nigeria to the AU Peace Fund?

The study found that over 78% of the respondents had never heard about the AU Peace Fund, and the rest stumbled into it outside institutional involvement. The implication is that if the Private sector is not involved in the policy formulation and design process, there will be a lack of ownership and stake in the implementation process, resulting in a passive private sector component of the policy.

Q5: What is the level of awareness of Nigeria's Organised Private-Sector of the 2016 AU Policy on Silencing the Guns (2016)?

The study shows that 97.3% of respondents are unaware of the AU Policy on Silencing the Guns by 2020. It found a gross lack of institutional awareness of the organised private sector of the AU Peace Fund policy and non-involvement of the Sector in the policy design process. If the private sector is not involved in the policy formulation and design process, there will be a lack of ownership and stake in the implementation process, resulting in a passive private sector component of the policy. Key Informants interviewed high-ranking officials from the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria (MAN) and the Nigerian Economic Summit Group (NESG) indicated a lack of awareness and involvement of the Sector. The long years of service of 92% of the respondents also support the findings, corroborating with findings from the literature review.

Q6: **Was the Organised Private Sector involved in designing the 2016 AU Peace Fund policy on Silencing the Guns?**

The study found that most respondents and their organisations were not consulted in the 2016 AU Peace Fund policy on Silencing the Guns policy design. The survey

indicates that 97% of respondents and their organisations were not consulted in the policy design process of the AU Peace Fund on Silencing the Guns. This is supported by responses from high-ranking officials from the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria (MAN) and the Nigerian Economic Summit Group (NESG). The long years of service in the private sector, which represents 92% of the respondents, also support the findings, collaborating findings from the literature review. The implication is a lack of private sector interest and stake in the policy implementation process, resulting in a passive private sector policy component, given the top-down approach nature of the policy, which is characteristic of policy formulation in Nigeria.

4.5 Testing of Assumption

The research findings agree with the hypothesis that the Private Sector's non-involvement in the policy formulation of the AU peace fund is responsible for its lack of engagement with peace efforts in Africa.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Conclusion

Despite several attempts to operationalise the AU Peace Fund, including the AU's Silencing Guns Policy (2016) for enhanced peace and security on the continent involving the private sector, African countries remain in conflict and war. This is indicated by the Fragile State Index of 2023, compared with the 2016 index, which indicates no change in the fragility context for African countries.

The Fragile State Index, which measures the fragility of states in terms of peace and security, shows that African countries are still among the most fragile and rank very low on the Index. The number of conflicts and battle-related deaths between 1989 and 2021 in Figure 1 (Palik et al., 2022) graphically represents the scope of the issue.

The study concludes that the private sector component of the AU Peace Fund, with its potential capacity to support governmental efforts for peace and security, has yet to be activated because the sector is unaware of and not involved in the initiative's policy design process. The research also exposes the lack of scholarly literature on multilateral funding strategies and the level of private-sector involvement in the AU Peace Fund. It provides insight into the lack of awareness of Nigeria's Organized Private Sector of the AU Peace Fund. The study has filled the gap regarding the dearth of literature on private sector involvement in multilateral peace funding. The study reveals key salient features of multilateral peacebuilding facilities: support peace and security activities and deliver fast, flexible, relevant, risk-tolerant funding and strategic funds management. The study concludes that the AU Peace Fund has

been operationally inefficient as it has yet to achieve its objectives of entrenching peace for development in Africa and faces critical funding challenges. The literature review and primary data from the field support this conclusion. Therefore, the study findings will benefit policymakers, donors, and private sector organisations.

5.2 Recommendations

The study recommends as follows:

i. The AU should improve its Policy development process, as a means of enhancing the chances of policy success.

ii. The AU should undertake a review of its Peace Funding policy and engage Africa's organized private sector in an inclusive policy development approach that ensures stakeholder engagement, towards a more peaceful and secure continent.

iii. With 97% of surveyed organized private sector executives in Nigeria being unaware of AU Peace Fund policies that require private sector engagement, the AU should be intentional in enhancing publicity and engagement of its policies and engagements in Africa's most populous country and one of its leading economies.

iv. Nigeria's Ministry of Foreign Affairs should improve its engagement with economic stakeholders in the country, as a means of highlighting multilateral polices and trends of interest, as well as prospects for cross-border economic expansion.

v. Nigeria’s organized private sector should demonstrate increased interest in multilateral policies and activities, as a means of proactively identifying and responding to international threats and opportunities, in line with its position as Africa’s most populous country and one of its leading economies.

5.3 Contributions to Knowledge

The research enhances understanding of multilateral funding strategies and the level of private sector involvement in the AU Peace Fund. It provides insight into the lack of awareness of Nigeria’s Organized Private Sector on the AU Peace Fund's role in promoting peace, as well as the role of the private sector in the peace effort. The study helps to fill the gap regarding the dearth of literature on poor private sector involvement in multilateral peace funding. Therefore, the study findings will benefit policymakers, donors, and private sector organisations.

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APPENDIXES

QUESTIONNAIRE ON ENGAGEMENT OF NIGERIA'S ORGANISED PRIVATE SECTOR AND THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE FUND

Dear Respondent,

I am an MSc student of Public Policy at the African University of Science and Technology, Abuja, Nigeria. I am researching the African Union (AU) Peace Fund Policy designed to enhance peace and security in Africa-with private sector involvement. The study focuses on the Organized Private Sector's engagement level in Nigeria, with the AU Peace Fund's efforts across Africa.

I request your kind assistance in completing the questionnaire using the link below. Your confidential feedback will contribute to effective policymaking in Africa. Rest assured that your response is anonymous and will be used for research purposes only.

Part A

1. **Gender:** ☐ Male ☐ Female ☐ Undisclosed

2. **Subsector:**

   ☐Financial Services
   ☐Manufacturing
   ☐Agriculture/Agribusiness
   ☐Oil and Gas
   ☐ICT
   ☐Others

3. **Membership**: ☐NACCIMA ☐MAN ☐NECA
   ☐NESG ☐NASSI ☐NASME

4. **Active Years in the Private Sector:** ☐0-4years ☐5-9years ☐ 10 years and above

5. **Cadre in the Private Sector:** ☐ Top management ☐Mid management
   ☐ Others

Part B: please tick as appropriate

6. **I am aware of the African Union Peace Fund.**

- ☐ Strongly agree
- ☐ Agree
- ☐ Neutral

- Disagree
- Strongly disagree

7. **I was aware/involved/consulted in the design of the AU Peace Fund Silencing The Guns Policy 2016 on Engagement with the African Private Sector**

- Strongly agree
- Agree
- Neutral
- Disagree
- Strongly disagree

8. **I/The organisation (s) I worked/work with has contributed to the AU Peace Fund**

- Strongly agree
- Agree
- Neutral
- Disagree
- Strongly disagree

9. **I am aware of the AU's policy to involve the private sector in peace efforts via the AU Peace Fund.**

- Strongly agree
- Agree
- Neutral
- Disagree
- Strongly disagree

10. **Please provide general comments on how the Private Sector can enhance the operations and objectives of the AU Peace Fund.**