Search
Now showing items 1-3 of 3
Resilient Provision of a Public and/or Private Good, or: Resilient Auctions of One Good in Unlimited Supply
(2008-12-02)
We present two resilient mechanisms: the first for the provision of a public good, and the second for the provision of a private good. Both mechanisms adopt a knowledge-based benchmark.
Resilient Mechanisms For Truly Combinatorial Auctions
(2008-11-13)
Dominant-strategy truthfulness is traditionally considered the best possible solution concept in mechanism design, as it enables one to predict with confidence which strategies INDEPENDENT players will actually choose. ...
Resilient Auctions of One Good in Limited Supply
(2008-12-17)
We present various resilient auction mechanisms for a good in limited supply. Our mechanisms achieve both player-knowledge and aggregated player-knowledge benchmarks.