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The Security Power of the Ballot Box

dc.date.accessioned2005-12-22T02:20:57Z
dc.date.accessioned2018-11-24T10:24:22Z
dc.date.available2005-12-22T02:20:57Z
dc.date.available2018-11-24T10:24:22Z
dc.date.issued2005-02-02
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/30519
dc.identifier.urihttp://repository.aust.edu.ng/xmlui/handle/1721.1/30519
dc.description.abstractWe show that any function F can be securely evaluated by a protocolwith ballots and a ballot box. That is, N mutually suspicious players,each player possessing a secret input, can use ballots and a ballotbox to jointly evaluate F on their secret inputs so that (no matterhow many players may collude and deviate from their prescribed instructions, and no matter how long they compute!) each player learnsexactly the output of the function with the same privacy and correctnessas if all players privately handed their secret inputs to a trustedparty, who privately evaluates F and privately returns the outputs toeach player.Our protocol is (1) efficient, (2) enjoys perfect privacy, (3) guarantees perfect correctness, (4) is universally composable, and (5)is collusion-free even for games with secret actions.
dc.format.extent12 p.
dc.format.extent10126165 bytes
dc.format.extent427313 bytes
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.titleThe Security Power of the Ballot Box


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