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Collective Choice with Uncertain Domain Moldels

dc.date.accessioned2005-12-22T02:36:19Z
dc.date.accessioned2018-11-24T10:24:35Z
dc.date.available2005-12-22T02:36:19Z
dc.date.available2018-11-24T10:24:35Z
dc.date.issued2005-08-16
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/30565
dc.identifier.urihttp://repository.aust.edu.ng/xmlui/handle/1721.1/30565
dc.description.abstractWhen groups of individuals make choices among several alternatives, the most compelling social outcome is the Condorcet winner, namely the alternative beating all others in a pair-wise contest. Obviously the Condorcet winner cannot be overturned if one sub-group proposes another alternative it happens to favor. However, in some cases, and especially with haphazard voting, there will be no clear unique winner, with the outcome consisting of a triple of pair-wise winners that each beat different subsets of the alternatives (i.e. a  top-cycle .) We explore the sensitivity of Condorcet winners to various perturbations in the voting process that lead to top-cycles. Surprisingly, variations in the number of votes for each alternative is much less important than consistency in a voter s view of how alternatives are related. As more and more voter s preference orderings on alternatives depart from a shared model of the domain, then unique Condorcet outcomes become increasingly unlikely.
dc.format.extent18 p.
dc.format.extent17793797 bytes
dc.format.extent614937 bytes
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.subjectAI
dc.subjectcollective choice
dc.subjectuncertainty
dc.subjectvoting
dc.subjecttop-cycles
dc.titleCollective Choice with Uncertain Domain Moldels


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