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Subcontracted Rational SFE

dc.date.accessioned2005-12-22T02:40:29Z
dc.date.accessioned2018-11-24T10:24:39Z
dc.date.available2005-12-22T02:40:29Z
dc.date.available2018-11-24T10:24:39Z
dc.date.issued2005-11-02
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/30581
dc.identifier.urihttp://repository.aust.edu.ng/xmlui/handle/1721.1/30581
dc.description.abstractIn their paper, "Rational Secure Computation and Ideal Mechanism Design," Izmalkov, Lepinski and Micali show that any one-shot mediated game can be simulated by the players themselves, without the help of a trusted mediator, using physical envelopes and a ballot-box. We show that communication between the players is not essential to the ILM protocol. That is, we provide a protocol for rational secure function evaluation (Rational SFE) where the players just send a set of envelopes to a referee who simply performs a sequence of publicly verifiable actions. That is, the players can "subcontract" all of the computation to an untrusted referee. In addition to providing a communication structure that more closely matches the ideal game, our protocol also enables us to better simulate mediated games in which abort is not a dominated action.
dc.format.extent6 p.
dc.format.extent8137326 bytes
dc.format.extent296971 bytes
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.titleSubcontracted Rational SFE


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