| dc.date.accessioned | 2007-11-02T20:30:07Z | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2018-11-24T10:25:47Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2007-11-02T20:30:07Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2018-11-24T10:25:47Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2007-11-02 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/39420 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://repository.aust.edu.ng/xmlui/handle/1721.1/39420 | |
| dc.description.abstract | In auctions of a single good, the second-price mechanism achieves, in dominantstrategies, a revenue benchmark that is naturally high and resilient to anypossible collusion.We show how to achieve, to the maximum extent possible, the same propertiesin combinatorial auctions. | en_US |
| dc.format.extent | 20 p. | en_US |
| dc.relation | Massachusetts Institute of Technology Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory | en_US |
| dc.subject | Worst Rational Setting | en_US |
| dc.subject | Natural Solution Pairs | en_US |
| dc.subject | Player-Monotone Benchmarks | en_US |
| dc.subject | Revenue Guarantees | en_US |
| dc.subject | Guaranteed Revenue | en_US |
| dc.title | Collusion-Resilient Revenue In Combinatorial Auctions | en_US |
