Generalization of the MV Mechanism
| dc.date.accessioned | 2008-05-05T15:45:41Z | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2018-11-26T22:25:15Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2008-05-05T15:45:41Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2018-11-26T22:25:15Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2008-05-01 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/41515 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://repository.aust.edu.ng/xmlui/handle/1721.1/41515 | |
| dc.description.abstract | Micali and Valiant proposed a mechanism for combinatorial auctions that is dominant-strategy truthful, guarantees reasonably high revenue, and is very resilient against collusions. Their mechanism, however, uses as a subroutine the VCG mechanism, that is not polynomial time.We propose a modification of their mechanism that is efficient, while retaining their collusion resilience and a good fraction of their revenue, if given as a subroutine an efficient approximation of the VCG mechanism. | en_US |
| dc.format.extent | 7 p. | en_US |
| dc.relation | Massachusetts Institute of Technology Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory | en_US |
| dc.relation | en_US | |
| dc.title | Generalization of the MV Mechanism | en_US |
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| MIT-CSAIL-TR-2008-023.pdf | 251.7Kb | application/pdf | View/ |
| MIT-CSAIL-TR-2008-023.ps | 73.87Kb | application/postscript | View/ |