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Revenue in Truly Combinatorial Auctions and Adversarial Mechanism Design

dc.date.accessioned2008-06-30T13:00:26Z
dc.date.accessioned2018-11-26T22:25:20Z
dc.date.available2008-06-30T13:00:26Z
dc.date.available2018-11-26T22:25:20Z
dc.date.issued2007- 11-02en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/41872
dc.identifier.urihttp://repository.aust.edu.ng/xmlui/handle/1721.1/41872
dc.description.abstractLittle is known about generating revenue in UNRESTRICTED combinatorial auctions. (In particular, the VCG mechanism has no revenue guarantees.) In this paper we determine how much revenue can be guaranteed in such auctions. Our analysis holds both in the standard model, when all players are independent and rational, as well as in a most adversarial model, where some players may bid collusively or even totally irrationally.en_US
dc.format.extent30 p.en_US
dc.relationMassachusetts Institute of Technology Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratoryen_US
dc.relationen_US
dc.subjectRevenue Benchmarksen_US
dc.subjectRevenue lowerboundsen_US
dc.subjectrevenue upperboundsen_US
dc.subjectProbabilistic DST mechanismsen_US
dc.titleRevenue in Truly Combinatorial Auctions and Adversarial Mechanism Designen_US


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