| dc.date.accessioned | 2008-10-08T20:15:07Z | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2018-11-26T22:25:46Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2008-10-08T20:15:07Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2018-11-26T22:25:46Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2008-10-08 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/42893 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://repository.aust.edu.ng/xmlui/handle/1721.1/42893 | |
| dc.description.abstract | Following Micali and Valiant [MV07.a], a mechanism is resilient if it achieves its objective without any problem of (1) equilibrium selection and (2) player collusion. To advance resilient mechanism design,We put forward a new meaningful benchmark for the COMBINED social welfare-revenue performance of any mechanism in truly combinatorial auctions.We put forward a NEW notion of implementation, much more general than the ones used so far, which we believe to be of independent interest.We put forward a new RESILIENT mechanism that, by leveraging the knowledge that the players have about each other, guarantees at least one half of our benchmark under a very general collusion model. | en_US |
| dc.format.extent | 32 p. | en_US |
| dc.relation | MIT-CSAIL-TR-2008-041 | |
| dc.subject | knowledge benchmarks | en_US |
| dc.subject | implementation in surviving strategies | en_US |
| dc.subject | equilibrium-less implementation | en_US |
| dc.subject | combinatorial auctions | en_US |
| dc.subject | resilient mechanisms | en_US |
| dc.subject | collusion | en_US |
| dc.subject | truly combinatorial auctions | en_US |
| dc.title | New Resiliency in Truly Combinatorial Auctions (and Implementation in Surviving Strategies) | en_US |
