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Resilient Auctions of One Good in Limited Supply

dc.date.accessioned2008-12-17T21:00:03Z
dc.date.accessioned2018-11-26T22:25:50Z
dc.date.available2008-12-17T21:00:03Z
dc.date.available2018-11-26T22:25:50Z
dc.date.issued2008-12-17
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/43947
dc.identifier.urihttp://repository.aust.edu.ng/xmlui/handle/1721.1/43947
dc.description.abstractWe present various resilient auction mechanisms for a good in limited supply. Our mechanisms achieve both player-knowledge and aggregated player-knowledge benchmarks.en_US
dc.format.extent3 p.en_US
dc.subjectResilient mechanism designen_US
dc.subjectKnowledge-Based Benchmarksen_US
dc.subjectPlayer-Knowledge Benchmarksen_US
dc.subjectAggregated Knowledge-Based Benchmarksen_US
dc.subjectAggregated Player-Knowledge Benchmarksen_US
dc.titleResilient Auctions of One Good in Limited Supplyen_US


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