| dc.date.accessioned | 2009-12-09T21:15:08Z | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2018-11-26T22:26:11Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2009-12-09T21:15:08Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2018-11-26T22:26:11Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2009-12-04 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/49869 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://repository.aust.edu.ng/xmlui/handle/1721.1/49869 | |
| dc.description.abstract | We show that, when the players are perfectly informed about each other, essentially all social-choice functions can be rationally robustly implemented via an extensive-form public-action mechanism that (1) is perfectly robust against collusion, (2) requires only a linear number of computation steps and communication bits, and (3) preserves the privacy of the players' types to a very high extent. | en_US |
| dc.format.extent | 4 p. | en_US |
| dc.subject | rationally robust implementation | en_US |
| dc.subject | Virtual implementation | en_US |
| dc.subject | perfectly informed players | en_US |
| dc.title | Perfect and General Virtual Implementation For Perfectly Informed Players | en_US |
