Conservative-Bayesian Mechanisms
| dc.date.accessioned | 2010-09-11T00:00:46Z | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2018-11-26T22:26:24Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2010-09-11T00:00:46Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2018-11-26T22:26:24Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2010-09-08 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | en_US | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/58486 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://repository.aust.edu.ng/xmlui/handle/1721.1/58486 | |
| dc.description.abstract | We put forward a new class of mechanisms. In this extended abstract, we exemplify our approach only for single-good auctions in what we call a conservative-Bayesian setting. (Essentially, no common-knowledge about the underlying distribution of the players' valuations is required.) We prove that our mechanism is optimal in this challenging and realistic setting. | en_US |
| dc.format.extent | 5 p. | en_US |
| dc.title | Conservative-Bayesian Mechanisms | en_US |
Files in this item
| Files | Size | Format | View |
|---|---|---|---|
| MIT-CSAIL-TR-2010-042.pdf | 186.8Kb | application/pdf | View/ |