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Conservative-Bayesian Mechanisms

dc.date.accessioned2010-09-11T00:00:46Z
dc.date.accessioned2018-11-26T22:26:24Z
dc.date.available2010-09-11T00:00:46Z
dc.date.available2018-11-26T22:26:24Z
dc.date.issued2010-09-08
dc.identifier.citationen_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/58486
dc.identifier.urihttp://repository.aust.edu.ng/xmlui/handle/1721.1/58486
dc.description.abstractWe put forward a new class of mechanisms. In this extended abstract, we exemplify our approach only for single-good auctions in what we call a conservative-Bayesian setting. (Essentially, no common-knowledge about the underlying distribution of the players' valuations is required.) We prove that our mechanism is optimal in this challenging and realistic setting.en_US
dc.format.extent5 p.en_US
dc.titleConservative-Bayesian Mechanismsen_US


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