A Social-Welfare Optimal Probabilistic Mechanism for Knightian Single-Good Auctions
| dc.date.accessioned | 2012-09-07T22:15:03Z | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2018-11-26T22:26:53Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2012-09-07T22:15:03Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2018-11-26T22:26:53Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2012-09-07 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/72584 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://repository.aust.edu.ng/xmlui/handle/1721.1/72584 | |
| dc.description.abstract | We provide an optimal probabilistic mechanism for maximizing social welfare in single-good auctions when each player does not know his true valuation for the good, but only a set of valuations that is guaranteed to include his true one. | en_US |
| dc.format.extent | 19 p. | en_US |
| dc.subject | Knightian Auctions | en_US |
| dc.subject | Probabilistic Mechanisms | en_US |
| dc.subject | Social Welfare | en_US |
| dc.title | A Social-Welfare Optimal Probabilistic Mechanism for Knightian Single-Good Auctions | en_US |
Files in this item
| Files | Size | Format | View |
|---|---|---|---|
| MIT-CSAIL-TR-2012-028.pdf | 648.0Kb | application/pdf | View/ |