Possibilistic Beliefs and Higher-Level Rationality
| dc.date.accessioned | 2014-06-10T21:00:02Z | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2018-11-26T22:27:12Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2014-06-10T21:00:02Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2018-11-26T22:27:12Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2014-06-09 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/87727 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://repository.aust.edu.ng/xmlui/handle/1721.1/87727 | |
| dc.description.abstract | We consider rationality and rationalizability for normal-form games of incomplete information in which the players have possibilistic beliefs about their opponents. In this setting, we prove that the strategies compatible with the players being level-k rational coincide with the strategies surviving a natural k-step iterated elimination procedure. We view the latter strategies as the (level-k) rationalizable ones in our possibilistic setting. | en_US |
| dc.format.extent | 10 p. | en_US |
| dc.title | Possibilistic Beliefs and Higher-Level Rationality | en_US |
Files in this item
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|---|---|---|---|
| MIT-CSAIL-TR-2014-013.pdf | 203.3Kb | application/pdf | View/ |